

Message Text

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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 PARIS 31450/1

EXDIS

FROM THE AMBASSADOR FOR THE SECRETARY

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS:

SUBJECT: US - EUROPEAN RELATIONS

1. IN THE SEVEN MONTHS SINCE SECRETARY KISSINGER CALLED FOR REAFFIRMATION OF OUR COMMON IDEALS AND PURPOSE WITH EUROPE, THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, LARGELY THANKS TO FRENCH INTRANSIGENCE, HAS BEEN UNWILLING TO AGREE ON A DECLARATION TO ACHIEVE THIS GOAL. WHILE THE EUROPEANS ACCEPT A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH US IN THE SECURITY SECTOR, AS REFLECTED IN THEIR DRAFT ALLIANCE DECLARATION, THEY REJECT IT IN THE US-EC DRAFT, AGAIN FOLLOWING THE FRENCH LEAD.

2. THE MAIN REASON FOR FRENCH INTRASIGENCE IS THAT THEY BELIEVE GREATER US PARTICIPATION IN EUROPE WILL SMOTHER THE DEVELOPMENT OF A TRUE EUROPEAN IDENTITY, WILL RESULT IN US DOMINANCE OVER EUROPE, AND WORST OF ALL, WILL ENDANGER THE ABILITY OF FRANCE TO ACHIEVE EUROPEAN UNIFICATION ON FRENCH TERMS AND TO ACCOMPLISH THEIR NATIONAL OBJECTIVES THROUGH A UNITED EUROPE.

3. THE OTHER EIGHT SEE THE UNIFICATION OF EUROPE AND ITS RELATIONS WITH THE US IN LESS CLEAR AND PERHAPS LESS NATIONALISTIC TERMS, I.E. COMPARED TO THE FRENCH, AND IN VARYING DEGREE ARE MUCH MORE WILLING TO JOIN IN PARTNERSHIP WITH THE US. THEY ARE DRAWN IN TWO DIRECTIONS. FIRST, THEY BELIEVE IN AND ARE ANXIOUS TO ACHIEVE EUROPEAN UNITY THIS CAN ONLY BE ACHIEVED IN RELATIVE HARMONY WITH THE FRENCH. THIS GIVES THE FRENCH GREAT INFLUENCE AND ROOM
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TO MANEUVER. SECOND, AGAIN IN VARYING DEGREE, THEY WISH TO ENJOY A CLOSE AND SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH THE US, NOT ONLY IN DEFENSE BUT ALSO IN OTHER FIELDS. BUT THEY HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE TO RECONCILE THESE CONFLICTING PRESSURES AND HAVE ADOPTED WHAT

APPEARS TO THEM TO BE THE "LEAST RISK" OPTION OF APPEASING FRANCE. THE RESULT IS THAT THE TYPE OF DECLARATION ORIGINALLY PROPOSED BY THE SECRETARY APPEARS UNATTAINABLE IN THE PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES. THE QUESTION IS HOW WE SHOULD NOW PROCEED. WE COULD REFUSE TO SIGN THE EC DOCUMENT ON THE GROUNDS THAT THE PRESENT NARROW DEFINITION OF COMMON INTERESTS COULD LIMIT--OR COULD BE USED BY THOSE OPPOSED TO CLOSER US-EUROPEAN RELATIONS TO LIMIT--PROGRESS TOWARDS THE TYPE OF RELATIONSHIP WE SEEK. REFUSAL TO SIGN WOULD CAUSE CONSTERNATION AMONG OUR ALLIES IN THE COMMUNITY AND WOULD PLAY INTO FRENCH HANDS. IF SHOCK TREATMENT IS WHAT IS DESIRED, HOWEVER, THIS WOULD BE AN APPROPRIATE COURSE OF ACTION.

3. A VARIATION WOULD BE TO DRAW THE NEGOTIATIONS OUT TO THE POINT WHERE THE ISSUE SIMPLY FADED AWAY. WE WOULD NOT SIGN AN EC DOCUMENT, BUT OUR REFUSAL TO DO SO WOULD BE HANDLED SO THAT IT WOULD NOT APPEAR TO OUR ALLIES OR TO THE PUBLIC AS A DRAMATIC RUPTURE IN US-EC RELATIONS. THIS MIGHT REPRESENT A REASONABLE WAY OF CUTTING LOSSES IF IT IS DECIDED IN THE END THAT THE EC DOCUMENT IS UNACCEPTABLE.

4. AN ALTERNATIVE COURSE WOULD BE TO SIGN AN EC DECLARATION THAT FALLS SHORT OF US ASPIRATIONS IN THE HOPE THAT IT WOULD PROVIDE A BASIS FOR FUTURE PROGRESS. THIS WOULD BE REGARDED BY THE GERMANS AND OTHERS AS A POSITIVE COURSE BECAUSE IT WOULD CONSTITUTE A FORMAL RECOGNITION OF THE EXISTENCE OF AN EUROPEAN ENTITY. THE GERMANS AND OTHERS ALSO CONTEND THAT THE DECLARATION DOES PROVIDE A VEHICLE FOR EVENTUALLY ESTABLISHING A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH THE US, OR AT LEAST DOESN'T CLOSE THE DOOR ON THE POSSIBILITY. ON THE OTHER HAND, SIGNING A LESS THAN SATISFACTORY DOCUMENT, ESPECIALLY IN THE FANFARE OF A SUMMIT MEETING, COULD INHIBIT SUCH PROGRESS IF IT APPEARED WE WERE FORMALLY ENDORSING A POLICY OF "INTERDEPENDENCE IN DEFENSE--INDEPENDENCE ELSEWHERE." A VARIATION OF THIS COURSE WOULD BE TO SIGN THE DOCUMENT WITH LITTLE FANFARE AND MAKE CLEAR OUR RESERVATIONS

WHILE EXPRESSING THE DESIRE THAT IT BE A BASE ON WHICH TO BUILD.

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5. FINALLY, THE DECISION ON WHETHER OR NOT TO SIGN MIGHT BE POSTPONED UNTIL A CLEARER PICTURE IS AVAILABLE OF HOW CURRENT EVENTS, THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE ENERGY CRISIS, AFFECT THE COMMUNITY. ONE POSITIVE OUTCOME OF THIS CRISIS HAS BEEN TO DEMONSTRATE TO EUROPEANS AND AMERICANS ALIKE OUR ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE AND VULNERABILITY. HENCE, IT IS POSSIBLE THAT WITH TIME AND CONTINUING PATIENT NEGOTIATIONS A MORE ACCEPTABLE DECLARATION MIGHT BE FORTHCOMING.

6. BUT THE QUESTION OF TACTICS ON THIS ISSUE RAISES THE LARGER QUESTION OF THE SORT OF BASIC RELATIONSHIP WE WANT WITH THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY. WE SAY WE WANT PARTNERSHIP BUT IT IS NOT ALWAYS CLEAR TO THE EUROPEANS WHETHER WE WANT A RELATIONSHIP

BASED ON EQUALS COORDINATING AND CONSULTING IN REASONABLE DEPTH ON FOREIGN AND DEFENSE POLICIES, OR WHETHER WE WANT THE SORT OF RELATIONSHIP WHICH THE EUROPEANS WILL REGARD AS ESSENTIALLY OUT OF BALANCE.

7. EUROPE'S MISGIVINGS ARE INSPIRED IN PART BY THE FACT THAT A TRUE PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE HAS NEVER EXISTED. IN THE FIRST DECADE AFTER THE WAR, THE RELATIONSHIP WAS SO LOPSIDED THAT REAL PARTNERSHIP WAS IMPOSSIBLE AND A WEAKENED, DIVIDED EUROPE WAS CONTENT TO ACCEPT THE ACROSS-THE-BOARD PREDOMINANCE OF THE UNITED STATES. AS EUROPE BECAME ECONOMICALLY STRONGER, THIS RELATIONSHIP BECAME INCREASINGLY IRRITATING TO THE EUROPEANS AND BEGAN TO DEGENERATE INTO BICKERING AND GROWING ECONOMIC RIVALRY.

8. NEITHER THE UNITED STATES NOR EUROPE IS WILLING TO ACCEPT THE OLD LOPSIDED RELATIONSHIP ANY LONGER -- THE UNITED STATES IS NO LONGER WILLING TO PROVIDE THE BULK OF EUROPE'S DEFENSE WITHOUT A MORE SATISFACTORY RELATIONSHIP IN THE ECONOMIC AREA, AND THE EUROPEANS BELIEVE THEIR GROWING ECONOMIC STRENGTH GIVES THEM THE RIGHT TO DEAL ON A MORE EQUAL FOOTING WITH THE UNITED STATES IN ALL FIELDS.

9. EVEN OUR CLOSEST ALLIES AMONG THE NINE HAVE BEGUN TO EXPRESS A GROWING CONCERN ABOUT THE INTENTIONS AND SOME RECENT POLICIES OF THE US ON DEFENSE, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL ISSUES. IN PART THIS CONCERN MAY CENTER ON THE SPECIFIC ISSUE ITSELF, BUT IN A LARGER PART IT CENTERS ON HOW THEY VIEW US HANDLING OF THESE ISSUES. IN SECRET

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THE DEFENSE FIELD, THEY HAVE WATCHED THE APPARENT INCREASING APPEAL OF THE MANSFIELD AMENDMENT AND THE MANAGEMENT, OVER THEIR HEADS AS THEY SEE IT, OF SUCH ISSUES OF SALT, MBFR, THE AGREEMENT TO PREVENT NUCLEAR WAR. IN THESE AREAS THEY APPRECIATE THAT THEY WERE INFORMED IN VARYING DEGREES, BUT WHAT THEY WANT IS TO BE CONSULTED. THEY ARE WARY OF DETENTE, NOT IN THE SENSE OF BEING OPPOSED TO IT PER SE, BUT BECAUSE THEY FEAR WHAT THE FRENCH HAVE TAUGHT THEM TO CALL "CONDOMINIUM." IN THE ECONOMIC FIELD THEY WERE SHOCKED BY THE CONNALLY PRESSURES, BY AUGUST 15, 1971, SOY-BEANS, ETC. DURING THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS, EVEN THOUGH EFFORTS WERE MADE TO KEEP THEM INFORMED, THEY RESENT WHAT IN THEIR VIEW WAS LACK OF ADEQUATE CONSULTATIONS IN REGARD TO AN AREA OF VITAL INTEREST TO THEM. ON ALL OF THESE CONCERNS, THE FRENCH HAVE TAKEN THE LEAD IN PUBLICALLY VOICING THEIR DISCONTENT; BUT FRENCH THEMES ARE INCREASINGLY FINDING AN ECHO IN THE OTHER EC CAPITALS.

10. IN LIGHT OF THEIR CONCERNS AND RESENTMENTS, TO WHATEVER DEGREE JUSTIFIED, PRESSURE ON THE COMMUNITY TO NEGOTIATE A NEW RELATIONSHIP HAS STIMULATED THE EUROPEANS IN THEIR ATTEMPT TO DEFINE A EUROPEAN IDENTITY. THEY HAVE CONCLUDED, AGAIN LARGELY UNDER FRENCH LEADERSHIP, THAT THEY MUST DEFINE THEIR IDENTITY

AND ADOPT COMMON POSITIONS, MAKING IT POSSIBLE FOR THE NINE TO SPEAK WITH ONE VOICE, BEFORE NEGOTIATING WITH THE UNITED STATES. THIS MEANS THAT EUROPE HAS NOW MADE A SMALL START ON THE LONG PROCESS OF POLITICAL UNIFICATION, WITH THE RESULT THAT THEY ARE BEGINNING TO TAKE INDEPENDENT "EUROPEAN" POSITIONS ON SOME MAJOR ISSUES, E.G. THE NOVEMBER 6 DECLARATION OF THE MIDDLE EAST AND THEIR DIRECT APPROACH TO JAPAN FOR A BILATERAL DECLARATION. IN THE PAST THE UNITED STATES VIEWED THE EMERGENCE OF A UNITED EUROPE WITH EQUANIMITY BECAUSE IT WAS ASSUMED A UNIFIED EUROPE (SHARING SO MANY COMMON INTERESTS AND VALUES WITH THE UNITED STATES) WOULD NORMALLY SIDE WITH THE UNITED STATES ON MAJOR ISSUES. MOREOVER, WE BELIEVED -- AND STILL BELIEVE -- THAT A DIVIDED EUROPE COULD BE A SEEDBED OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT AND AN EASY TARGET FOR SOVIET DESIGNS. ALTHOUGH IT IS NOW CLEAR THAT EUROPE CANNOT ALWAYS BE EXPECTED TO SIDE WITH THE UNITED STATES, THE BASIS OF US-EUROPEAN ECONOMIC, POLITICAL, AND CULTURAL TIES REMAINS INTACT AND TO THIS DEGREE THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE UNITY OF WESTERN EUROPE IS COMPATIBLE WITH UNITED STATES INTERESTS REMAINS VALID.

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5328

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EXDIS

FROM THE AMBASSADOR FOR THE SECRETARY

11. ON THE OTHER HAND, IT CAN BE ARGUED THAT A UNITED EUROPE WHICH REJECTS PARTNERSHIP WITH THE UNITED STATES COULD EVOLVE INTO A THIRD FORCE WHICH MIGHT BE IN OPPOSITION TO THE UNITED STATES ON A GROWING NUMBER OF ISSUES. THIS COULD AFFECT ADVERSELY PUBLIC SUPPORT IN THE UNITED STATES FOR CONTINUED AMERICAN PARTICIPATION IN EUROPEAN DEFENSE ARRANGEMENTS, EVEN THOUGH EUROPE'S ABILITY TO DEFEND ITSELF ALONG AGAINST THE SOVIETS IS NOT CREDIBLE. IF THE ENERGY CRISIS CONTINUES, EUROPE MAY SUFFER CONSIDERABLE ECONOMIC DISLOCATION WHICH WILL INTENSIFY ITS VULNERABILITY TO THE KINDS OF PRESSURES WHICH THE USSR AND ITS COMMUNIST PARTY ALLIES IN WESTERN EUROPE CAN PUT ON EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS AND SOCIETIES. THUS, A "THIRD FORCE" EUROPE COULD BECOME SUSCEPTIBLE TO A FORM OF "FINLANDIZATION." WHICH OF THESE OR SIMILAR COURSES A UNITING EUROPE TAKES WILL DEPEND IN LARGE MEASURE ON US POLICY AND

TACTICS.

12. COMMENT: TO THE DEGREE THAT THE UNITED STATES WORKS CLOSELY WITH THE ALLIANCE, WITH "EUROPE," THE UNITED STATES CAN IN TIME OVERCOME TO A CONSIDERABLE EXTENT THE INFLUENCE OF FRANCE. FORMERLY, THERE WAS OFTEN AN EIGHT TO ONE SPLIT IN THE EC. AT THAT TIME FRANCE DID NOT SEEM TO BE PARTICULARLY CONCERNED AT BEING ALONE, BUT NOW THEY ARE MORE LOATHE TO BE ISOLATED. CONSEQUENTLY, IF WE WERE IN AGREEMENT WITH THE EIGHT, THE EIGHT MIGHT BE ABLE TO BRING THE FRENCH ALONG, PROBABLY KICKING AND SCREAMING, ON AN INCREASING NUMBER OF ISSUES. ADMITTEDLY, IT IS NOW MORE DIFFICULT TO EXERCISE
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OUR LEADERSHIP IN EUROPE, BUT BY NO MEANS IMPOSSIBLE. BUT IT WOULD MEAN THE UNITED STATES WOULD HAVE TO ACT AS THOUGH EUROPE WERE A FULL PARTNER. IT MIGHT MEAN, ON OCCASION, COMING DOWN ON THE SIDE OF EUROPEANS VERSUS SOVIET RELATIONS BECAUSE MANY IN EUROPE TODAY ACCUSE US OF SACRIFICING EUROPEAN INTERESTS FOR THE SAKE OF US-USSR DETENTE. (THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE US WORLD-WIDE ALERT DURING THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS HAS NOT SUNK IN IN EUROPE, IN LARGE PART BECAUSE THEY CONTINUE TO NURSE THEIR BRUISED SENSIBILITIES OVER NOT BEING IN THEIR VIEW "ADEQUATELY CONSULTED OR INFORMED.") TO FORGE THE KIND OF RELATIONSHIP WE WANT WILL MEAN PAINSTAKING, OFTEN FRUSTRATING, EFFORTS TO EXPLAIN AND CONSULT ON MAJOR ISSUES WITH NATO AND EC COUNTRIES. IN THIS WAY, I THINK WE COULD CHANGE THE ATMOSPHERE AND INFLUENCE THE ATTITUDES OF THE EIGHT AND THUS, HOPEFULLY, AT LEAST

INDIRECTLY, THOSE OF FRANCE, PERHAPS MORE QUICKLY THAN NOW SEEMS LIKELY. BY NO MEANS DOES THIS PRESCRIPTION IMPLY THAT WE SHOULD ACCEPT FRENCH OR EUROPEAN PROPOSALS OR ACTS WITH WHICH WE DISAGREE. RATHER IT MEANS A COMBINATION OF FIRMNESS AND PATIENCE, ALONG WITH THE RECOGNITION THAT OUR INTERESTS ARE SERVED BY GOING MORE THAN HALFWAY IN TAKING ACCOUNT OF EUROPEAN SENSITIVITIES, ON PROCEDURES, BUT NOT ON SUBSTANCE WHERE WE DISAGREE. THE CONCLUSION, FROM OUR PERSPECTIVE, IS THAT THE UNITED STATES SHOULD REDOUBLE ITS EFFORTS TO REINVIGORATE THE ALLIANCE, IN PART BY ATTEMPTING TO CHANNEL COMMUNITY ENERGY INTO NATO. ON THE SPECIFIC ISSUE OF THE US-EC DECLARATION, OUR RECOMMENDATION IN LIGHT OF THE ABOVE IS TO POSTPONE THE DECISION ON WHETHER OR NOT TO SIGN UNTIL WELL INTO 1974 WHEN EVENTS AND CONTINUING NEGOTIATION MAY CREATE A MORE PROPITIOUS SITUATION. IF A DECISION ON THE ISSUE IS REQUIRED IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE, HOWEVER, OUR RECOMMENDATION WOULD BE TO SIGN THE PRESENT EC DRAFT WITHOUT FANFARE AND ATTEMPT TO USE IT AS A BASIS FOR DEVELOPING OVER TIME A RELATIONSHIP MORE TO OUR LIKING.
IRWIN

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